“RED VIENNA” 1923-1933: HOUSING REFORMS

Vienna council house complex “Sandleiten” in the 16th district

For the Christian Socialists Catholicism remained the central value, whereas the focus of the Social Democrats was on a welfare system that cared for the individual from the “cradle to the grave”. By establishing numerous clubs, societies and associations they tried to build a “counter-culture” to the traditional conservative Catholic Austrian culture. The centre of this huge reform project was “Red Vienna”, which was an independent federal state since 1921 and ruled by Social Democrats. There they could realise all their ideas for a new society. The new council houses were not only symbols of a new and better life style for the working classes but also architectural landmarks. They represented the centres of this counter-culture and harboured also offices of the various clubs and party organisations. By the conservatives they were viewed as the fortresses of the left.…

“RED VIENNA” 1923-1933: SOCIAL WELFARE

Städtisches Jörgerbad, Vienna, public bath opened in 1914, built by Friedrich Jäckel, Heinrich Goldemund and Franz Wejmola

 

Three areas of social reform dominate the impressive and internationally renowned social policy of “Red Vienna”: communal social welfare, social housing and the Viennese cultural and educational policy. Mayor Karl Seitz together with the city councillors Hugo Breitner for Finance, Julius Tandler for Social Welfare and Otto Glöckel for Education started a huge reform project from 1923 to 1933 that was admired elsewhere. Breitner introduced a new tax system for Vienna that taxed people progressively according to their expenditure. A high tax was levied on “consumption of luxury and pleasure”, such as champagne, night clubs, dancing halls, horse-race betting or theatres.  The proceeds from this new tax were used for building a new welfare and healthcare system and for constructing affordable and comfortable housing and schools. Several big community housing estates built during this time still exist, nowadays inhabited by tenants with a migration background as well as by indigenous Viennese. Many people, however, opposed this “housing construction tax” and Hugo Breitner was subject to very aggressive political attacks, partly with an anti-Semitic tendency.…

VIENNA: SOCIAL LEGISLATION 1918-1920

Already in the last years of World War I it had become necessary to make concessions to workers in order to keep the war economy running. The most important legislation included Tenant Protection in January 1917 and Grievance Commission in March 1917. Immediately after taking power on 30 October 1918 the provisional cabinet of Karl Renner began with an extensive programme of social reform under the Secretary for Social Affairs Ferdinand Hanusch. By applying clever tactics Hanusch succeeded in carrying out revolutionary reforms that would not have seemed possible earlier. He negotiated with employers and achieved material and institutional reforms for workers, always pointing to the Communist revolutionary attempt in Hungary as a threat to Austrian democracy. …

FIN-DE-SIECLE VIENNA: LIVING CONDITIONS OF THE WORKING CLASS

Statistical data of the time just before the outbreak of the First World War still show a considerable amount of children below the age of 14 at work in Vienna. This seems proof of a very slow retreat of child labour in Vienna. The phasing out of child labour was more due to a change in work technology than social protest. Another important impetus for the end of child labour in Vienna was the introduction of the “Reichsvolksschulgesetz” of 1869. This law extended compulsory schooling from six to eight years. Although it has to be noted that the law stipulated several exceptions because especially working class families depended on the income of the children and a loss of this income would have jeopardised their existence. Many working class parents considered obligatory school attendance a nuisance and refused to have the state prescribe what they were supposed to do with their children. Most considered three years of schooling as sufficient. In the late 19th century compliance with obligatory school attendance was the exception rather than the rule in Vienna. Before the turn of the century the authorities executed more rigid supervision, so that by 1900 the start of work for Viennese working class children had been postponed to 12 – 14 years of age.…

VIENNA: MUNICIPAL REFORMS IN THE LAST DECADES OF THE EMPIRE

In 1849 governmental autonomy was granted to all municipalities in the Habsburg Empire. Although thereafter Vienna enjoyed self-government, repeatedly the emperor intervened in its affairs. From 1850 onward, Vienna underwent rapid growth, expanding in 1890 to incorporate suburbs across the Danube and along the Vienna Woods. A municipal constitution of 1850 established a city council to be elected by tax-paying citizens divided into three classes. In 1885 the minimum taxation for suffrage was lowered to 5 gulden, excluding the poor until universal suffrage came in 1907. After 1890 the unwieldy city council of 138 members was directed by 25 of its members, the Stadtrat, who together with the mayor ran the city. As mayor of Vienna from 1897 to 1910 Karl Lueger (1844-1910) so dominated public life that next to Franz Josef he was the city’s best known citizen. Although Lueger had entered the city council as a Liberal in 1875, over the next decade he broke with liberalism and denounced international capitalism as a ”Jewish monopoly”. After being briefly an ally of Schönerer, he became a friend of Vogelsang whose doctrines he incorporated into the Christian Social Party, founded in 1893.…

VIENNA, THE “CAPITAL OF CENTRAL EUROPE”: POLITICAL CLIMATE IN THE LAST DECADES OF THE EMPIRE

Vienna Woods, “Schwarzenbergpark”

The Catholic church fostered several varieties of social thought in Austria. Chief among those was the Christian Socialism disseminated by Karl Baron von Vogelsang (1818-1890). During the 1880s his writings paved the way for Karl Lueger’s founding of the Christian Socialist Party. A converted Prussian protestant, he came to Vienna to edit the Catholic daily “Vaterland”. He wanted Christian ethics to replace capitalist competition and state socialism and Marxism only added to the evils of capitalism and liberalism in his opinion. In contrast with all these systems, Vogelsang sought not to increase productivity or to expand political rights, but to restore the hierarchical structure of medieval society. Vogelsang desired every business to become an industrial “family”, in which workers and owners would share management, each firm would belong to a branch corporation and each of these to the Industrial Chamber, where workers and owners would legislate economic and social policy for each industry. Artisans would be required to join a guild, which would fix the numbers of masters and apprentices. This medieval institution would shield its members from the dangers of individualism. But this sort of Catholic socialism could not stem the rise of anti-clericalism. In the forefront of anti-clericals, Social Democrats and free-thinkers denounced the control that the church retained over marriage and primary education. Catholics who married outside their faith were faced with so many impediments that in 1914 approximately 1 mill common-law marriages existed in the empire. The church further prohibited divorce and forbade former priests to marry, all of which contributed to the popularity of the “Los-von-Rom” movement. Concerning anti-Semitism the clergy was openly divided. Parish clergy, who were recruited from the lower middle class, often scandalised the episcopacy by openly preaching anti-Semitism. In 1898 the Viennese anti-Semite Georg Ritter von Schönerer (1842-1921) initiated the “Los-von-Rom” movement protesting against the power of the state church and offering a rehearsal for an eventual union of Cisleithania(western part of the empire) and the German Empire. In Austria Christian Socialism somehow blunted the “Los-von-Rom” movement. Although it did not perceptibly weaken the church, Schönerer’s success in branding the Roman Catholic Church an enemy of Germans predisposed some Catholics to accept Hitler’s anti-clericalism.…

THE EURO CRISIS AND THE FUTURE OF THE EURO

Austrian National Bank, Vienna, completed in 1925 by Ferdinand Glaser and Rudolf Eisler

The Euro was a grand experiment in real time much observed by economists. If you create a single currency you take away the two most important tools of governments to steer the economy, namely the exchange rate and the interest rate. In the first years the single currency system was working well, but that was no real test because there were no economic shocks. The first big shock was 2008 and all the fears of economists came true. Europe was not able to respond adequately.

Before the euro was created the question had to be posed: What are the conditions for a single currency? And unfortunately Europe did not satisfy any of those criteria. First, if there is a shock where regions are differently affected, is there true free labour mobility? In the US people move if there is not enough work in one region or state; there is no real identification with those places. That is totally different in Europe. Greece does not want an “empty” country with all the young moving to other parts of Europe. Second, there should not be too many economic differences for a single currency to work, but the idea was that the European countries would move more closely together with the euro and unfortunately that was a wrong assumption. The Maastricht criteria of 60% stock of debt and 3% flow of deficit should have moved the economies closer together, but there is no economic theory on these figures; they are completely arbitrary. On the contrary, there is evidence that even above 90% debt-GDP ratio there is no negative effect on growth. In the post-World War II years the US had 130% debt-GDP ratio and GB 250% and the Eisenhower administration reacted with an investment programme instead of an austerity programme, e.g. the GI bill which offered free higher education for everyone who needed it or the Highway bill with extensive investment in infrastructure or the R&D bill with government investment in scientific research. With these measures the debt GDP ratio went down to around 50% in a few years due to these governmental investments in human capital, infrastructure and science. Due to high economic growth rates these two countries got rid of their debt without any crisis.…

THE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS AND REFORMS IN EUROPE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRASH OF 2008

Austrian National Bank, Vienna

Is growth normal and are the recessions of the 1970s/80s and since 2008 just the exceptions to the rule? Calls for reform always follow economic crises. Here are two examples of reforms that were introduced in Europe and can certainly not be seen as meaningful: Due to the serious sovereign debt crisis starting in Greece in 2010 the Greek government was obliged to carry out a multitude of reform measures, called “The Long March to Recovery”, among them laws on household insolvency, bankruptcy, foreclosures and pension reform. In how far were those really reforms and how could they benefit the Greek society? The second example is taken from Latvia: When the country emerged from the USSR it was without debt and mortgages. Then mostly Scandinavian banks moved in and gave extensive loans to the Latvians which finally could not be paid back and the Latvians faced the threat of foreclosures. “Reforms” were carried out that the duty to pay back the loans could be extended to family members, which ended in foreclosures anyway. In which way are these two examples meaningful reforms?…

THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM IN THE 21st CENTURY

Vienna Federal Court Building, completed in 1839 (architect: Johann Fischer)

Levying hefty taxes on the top one per cent of a society ought to be the most natural thing for politicians seeking to please the masses. Yet most of today’s populist governments are more concerned with immigration and nationalist pride than with the top rate of income tax. This is a sign of the corrupting influence of inequality on democracy. It might be supposed that the more democratic a country’s institutions, the less inequality it should support. Rising inequality means that resources are concentrated in the hands of few and these should be ever more easily outvoted by the majority who are left with a shrinking share of national income. But studies of the relation between democracy and levels of inequality point in conflicting directions. They conclude that democracies raise more taxes than non-democracies, but this does not translate into lower levels of inequality necessarily. One possible reason for this disconnect is that people do not care much about inequality and therefore do not expect their politicians to do something about it. Yet when asked in surveys two thirds of Europeans express concern about current levels of inequality. Nevertheless, it is a fact that political agendas in Europe have become less focused on redistribution even as inequality has risen. Though both inequality and public concern about it are increasing, politicians seem less interested in tackling the problem. On the contrary, instead of increasing pressure on politicians to remedy unfair income distributions, rising inequality boosts the power of the rich, thus enabling them to counter the popular will. Research in political science shows that today’s rich wield outsize influence in Western democracies. The relation between concentrated wealth and political power of the rich is scarcely limited to political campaign spending or to the USA. The rich have many means to shape public opinion: financing nominally apolitical think-tanks or buying media outlets, for example. Although their power may sometimes be used to influence the result of a particular vote, it is often deployed more subtly to shape public narratives about which problems deserve attention. Matters related to “social order”, such as crime and immigration, are found in bills brought before European parliaments and issues such as economic justice are crowded out. This can be attributed to the “negative agenda power” of the rich. As their wealth increases, they have a greater ability to press politicians to emphasise some topics and ignore others. The evidence that concentrated wealth contributes to concentrated power is troubling. It suggests that reducing inequality becomes less likely even as it becomes more urgent. It implies that a vicious cycle of rising inequality is developing together with a loss of democratic accountability. From a historical perspective inequality inevitably rises until checked by disasters like wars or revolutions. Let’s hope that Europe’s one per cent is not all-powerful and uniform in its determination to keep distributional policies off the agenda. In functioning Western democracies political leaders might well find that redistribution can be a winner at the ballot box.

FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION AFTER 2008

“Sparkasse” Karlovy Vary, Czech Republic

Only feeble attempts at regulating financial markets have been made in the US, the Dodd-Frank Act, and in the EU, the European Systemic Risk Board, since the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010 was the most comprehensive US financial reform since the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. Banks were deregulated in 1999 by the Gramm-Leach- Bliley Act, which repealed the Glass-Steagall Act. The Dodd-Frank Act sought to regulate the financial markets and make another economic crisis less likely, just as the Glass-Steagall Act did after the economic crisis of 1929. …